House money effects, risk preferences and the public goods game  by Jing, Lin & Cheo, Roland
Economics Letters 120 (2013) 310–313Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
House money effects, risk preferences and the public goods game✩✩
Lin Jing, Roland Cheo ∗
Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, 27 Shanda Nanlu, 250100, China
h i g h l i g h t s
• House money effects and not loss aversion is present in the public goods game.
• Risk preferences and contribution in the public goods game are linked.
• Covered loss and Real loss treatments are statistically equivalent.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper investigates whether risk preferences inform the decision of how much to put into the public
account in the public goods game under the three different frames (the two house money effect frames:
the standard and covered-loss frames, as well as the real-loss frame). The main contribution of this paper
finds that the covered loss and real loss treatments are statistically equivalent. This assures researchers
that just introducing the notion of loss into an experimental treatment without the need for participants
to realize a real loss is still a valid experimental instrument. We also find that the house money effect is a
better explanation for the difference in contributions between gain and loss framing than loss aversion.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. -1. Introduction
The problem in distinguishing house money effects versus loss
aversion in the traditional public goods game is the inability of
experimenters to deliberately place subjects in a true loss setting.
Partly it is also the issue of self-selection since participants who
sign up who know beforehand of the potential of losing money
(ethically responsible protocol) versus thosewho do not (unethical
protocol) may be more risk-loving. This paper presents a public
goods experiment using three frames: a gain frame (the normal
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Open access under CC BY-NCgame), a covered-loss frame (the current norm for a loss frame)
and a real-loss frame which is the novelty of this paper. This is not
the first paper to use real losses in risky choice experiments (see
Etchart-Vincent and L’Haridon (2011); see Harrison (2007)).
Most of the public goods literature has also not considered
the role that risk preferences play in this game, though Houser
et al. (2010) has examined the effect of risk preferences on the
outcome of the trust game. This paper also follows this vein of
research by investigatingwhether peoples’ risk preferences inform
the decision of how much to put into the public goods game under
the three different frames (the two house money effect frames:
the standard and covered-loss frames, as well as the real-loss
frame).
2. Methodology
In order to go about this exercise, we use three framing devices
in the public goods game in order to control for possible house
money effects which could exacerbate risk loving preferences:
(1) a gain frame (Gain)
ND license. 
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Number of participants under each risk profile in the different treatment.
Treatment IRA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Gaina 0 0 0 0 6 5 5 1 1 2
C-L 1 0 1 2 13 1 2 0 0 0
R-L 1 0 1 2 5 2 1 4 3 1
a The two tailed t-test identifies that Gain and C-L are statistically different
(p-value = 0.0004), Gain and R-L are not (p-value = 0.586) and C-L and R-L are
statistically different (p-value = 0.0247).
(2) a covered loss frame (C-L),
(3) and a real loss frame (R-L).
Conceptually these are all the same game, however it is timing
whichwe vary. In the gain frame, it is the classic public goods game
where there is no notion of possible losses and players startwith an
endowment of 10 yuan; while in both loss frames, the players are
told initially that they lose 20 yuan while the public goods game
helps to offset their loss. In the covered loss version, players are
told from the start that at the end of the experiment, playerswould
be given an additional 30 yuan as a show-up fee for that day’s
experiment before they are informed of the 20 yuan loss associated
with the experiment (there is no opt-out option), while in the real
loss version, they are told that they would receive a show-up fee
but are not told the exact amount theywould receive until the very
end of the experiment. This can be also interpreted as a covered
loss frame with an uncertain initial endowment. We call this a real
loss frame as a description of the state of mind of the decision-
maker since hemay fully expect to realize a real loss. In order to be
ethically responsible, players involved in the real-loss frames who
were recruited by emails were told that the game had a possible
chance of loss and they were asked to bring 20 yuan (which would
be the maximum they could potentially lose) with them but that
therewould also be a remuneration from the experiment aswell as
a show-up fee. We expect that this additional piece of information
given to those participating in the two loss frame sessions to have
self-selection biases.
We therefore use the Holt and Laury (2002) risk assessment
protocol prior to participating in the public goods game (in all
three frames) in order to be able to ascertain each players’ risk
preferences which we believe are different due to self-selection
biases as a result of our modified call for participation in the
real loss frame. Having unequal types of player profiles with
different risk preferences in each of our samples does not hinder
us from examining whether risk preferences affect giving behavior
in the public goods game once we categorize giving behavior
by risk profile. We sent emails and recruited from our database
of 500 students. We selected the first 30 males and 30 females
who replied. The rest who replied were involved in two other
different experiments. We restricted each of our three sessions to
20 students (10 males and 10 females).
3. Determining risk profile
We follow the Holt and Laury (2002) test procedure and
conduct a binary lottery to ascertain the risk profile of all our
participants in each session. Following the literature, participants
choose Lottery A over Lottery B over ten choices. Lottery A is
usually preferred at the beginning and we look specifically at the
switch of choice to lottery B to determine our risk profile. We
follow the standard naming convention—Index of Risk Aversion
(IRA) to denote the point of switching between Lottery A to Lottery
B. Therefore an IRA of 6 means that they switched to Lottery B at
choice 6 (see Table 1).
We can see that indeed there are more risk loving players
in our pool of players in the two loss frames (IRA between 0and 4) whereas these players are not present in the gain frame. The
presence of more risk loving behavior in the domain of losses is a
fairly standard result in the prospect theory literature especially
dealing with decision-making under risk (see the seminal paper
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979); for experiments dealing with
Chinese students onprospect theory, see Sasaki et al. (2008)). There
are no highly risk averse players in the C-L frame (IRA between
8 and 10) but there are in both the Gain and R-L samples. The
weighted average IRA under the Gain, C-L and R-L frames are 6.6,
4.85 and 6.25 respectively. The literature using the Holt and Laury
procedure is common (Eckel andWilson, 2004;Houser et al., 2010).
4. Framing in the public goods game
In our gain frame, each subject received 10 Yuan at the begin-
ning of the experiment, and s/he should make a decision on how
much money (actually from 0 to 10 Yuan) to invest into the public
account and then keep the rest as his/her private endowment. Each
subject’s payment is determined by the following formula:
10− xi + 1N ∗ 2.4 ∗
N
i=1
xi = 10+ 2.4N ∗
N
j≠i
xj
− N − 2.4
N
∗ xi
where xi means the amount of money that the i-th subject put into
the public account, and N means the number of subjects in this
frame.
In the loss frame, subjects suffer an initial loss of 20 Yuan at
the outset of the experiment. Later each subject uses the public
account to offset his/her loss. Subjects are shown that the total
loss each subject would undertake is determined by the following
formula:
xi +

20− 1
N
∗ 2.4 ∗
N
i=1
xi

= 20− 2.4
N
∗
N
j≠i
xj
+ N − 2.4
N
∗ xi
where ximeans the immediate losswhich is themoney that the i-th
subject puts into the public account from his/her own pocket. N is
the same as before. Actually, in both our loss frames, the losses that
subjects incur will be offset by the show-up fee which we provide,
30 yuan. So the final payment for each subject is 30 Yuanminus the
total loss that s/he undertakes. Conceptually the gain frame and the
loss frames are the same in terms of the expected returns.
5. Results
5.1. Mean contribution of each treatment
Table 2 shows us the mean and standard deviation of contribu-
tions under each treatment controlling for the risk type of subjects
as we add fewer risk-loving players into the pool. This means that
we start with the most risk loving players and slowly add into the
pool more and more relatively risk averse players. The purpose is
to be able to recognize how as we allow more risk averse players
into the public good experiment, how much the contribution rate
changes since an economy is usually made up of many different
risk types.
We can see that in both loss treatments that more risk loving
players (IRA ≤ 3 and possibly IRA = 4) put low contributions
into the group account and highly risk averse players (IRA ≥ 8) in
the gain and real-loss treatments also put low contributions into
the group account since the inclusion of these players reduces the
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Mean contribution rate & STDEV under each particular risk profile.
IRA Treatment
Gain Covered-loss Real-loss
Mean STDEV Mean STDEV Mean STDEV
≤1 N/A N/A 0 (1) 0 (1)
≤2 N/A N/A 0 (1) 0 (1)
≤3 N/A N/A 0.5 (2) 0.71 2.5 (2) 3.54
≤4 N/A N/A 1 (4) 1.41 4.25 (4) 4.35
≤5 5.67 (6) 3.01 3.65 (17) 2.80 4.56 (9) 3.54
≤6 5.55 (11) 2.38 3.83 (18) 2.83 4.09 (11) 3.45
≤7 5.63 (16) 2.63 4.25 (20) 3.04 4.17 (12) 3.30
≤8 5.29 (17) 2.89 4.25 (20) 3.04 3.88 (16) 3.07
≤9 5.33 (18) 2.81 4.25 (20) 3.04 3.79 (19) 2.97
≤10 4.85 (20) 3.05 4.25 (20) 3.04 3.75 (20) 2.90
N/A refers to the fact that there are no players in our sample which correspond to
that particular risk level. For example, row4 tells us that there are no players of such
risk profile in the Gain treatment, while the mean contribution for 4 players in the
covered loss of those≤4 is 1 and that of the real-loss treatment is 4.25. Numbers in
brackets represent the number of players of that category.
Fig. 1. Average contribution as we include more and more risk-averse players.
group’s average contributions. It is also noted that those who are
more risk neutral in all three treatments tend to give the most.
We can see from Fig. 1 that the gain frame results in higher
contributions (controlling for risk profile) compared with the C-L
and R-L treatments which suggests that house money effects are
present especially for players who are more risk averse (IRA above
and equal to 5).1
What is interesting though is the existence of risk loving players
in the C-L and R-L treatments. For IRA levels between 1 and 3, we
can see that those in the real loss treatment tend to contribute a
lot less than in the covered loss treatment. In general, risk loving
players seem to free ride (as per game theoretical predictions) in
order to earn more. In the Gain and R-L treatments we can see
that from IRA 8 to 10, the addition of more andmore severely risk-
averse players leads to declining average contribution rates.
5.2. Comparing between the C-L, R-L and gain treatments controlling
for risk profile
Table 3 presents the difference of mean contributions compar-
ing all treatments and looking at the Mann–Whitney U test statis-
tics with the inclusion of more and more risk averse players. From
Table 3 we can see that the p-value of the difference between R-L
and C-L is very high, which means that there is no significant dif-
ference between C-L and R-L treatments. This gives added evidence
1 Sincewe do not have any risk loving players in our sample, we cannotmake any
comment for IRA 1–4 in the gain frame.Table 3
Absolute contribution difference & P-values after controlling the risk profile.
Treatment IRA
≤6 ≤7 ≤8 ≤9 ≤10
C-L-R-L Diff. −0.2576 0.8333 0.375 0.4605 0.5P-value 0.4910 0.4077 0.3052 0.2729 0.2538
Gain-R-L Diff. 1.4545 1.4583 1.4191 1.5439 1.1P-value 0.1392 0.0929 0.0723 0.0390 0.0839
Gain-C-L Diff. 1.7121 1.375 1.0441 1.0833 0.6P-value 0.0632 0.0737 a a a
a No C-L players of IRA 8, 9 or 10.
that covered loss frames give us essentially the same outcomes as
a real loss treatment. Hence experimental methodology does not
have to worry about a housemoney effect as a consequence of giv-
ing people house money in a loss frame.
Comparing the contributions between the Gain and R-L treat-
ments, we can see that the p-values are generally below 10% as
we include more and more risk averse players and include all but
the most risk averse players, the p-value is 0.039. Comparing the
Gain and C-L treatments, for players whose IRA is below or equal
to 6 and 7, the p-values are significant. As an added robustness
check, we redo another C-L treatment (a further 20 players) in
order to obtain highly risk averse players in our sample which
are not reported in this paper. The difference between the Gain
and new C-L treatment is more pronounced and significant while
the R-L and new C-L treatment remains statistically indistinguish-
able from one another. Therefore the results affirm our present
findings.
We wish to highlight the significant positive contribution
rates between gain and loss frames in the public goods game as
evidenced in Table 3. For example the average difference between
theGain andR-Lmean contribution rate is 1.1 yuan and the average
difference between the Gain and C-L mean contribution rate is
0.6 yuan. We cannot attribute this difference to loss aversion since
players who know they have lost and desire to lessen their loss
through participation in the public goods game do notmake higher
contributions than those in the gain frame. In prospect theory,
players tend to make risk loving choices in the domain of losses
but our results show contrary results. This lends more support to
the belief that house money effects are significant when players
participate in the gain frame than in the loss frame. The biggest
take-home from Table 3 shows us that there is little to statistically
distinguish between both the covered loss and real loss frames.
This is an important result for experimenters who may not have
the ability to account for self-selection biases in their data and yet
need to introduce notions of loss into their treatments. This paper
gives assurance to such researchers that as long as they can limit
self-selection biases in their recruitment protocol, a covered loss
frame serves just as well as a real loss frame.
6. Conclusion
The pattern of contribution in the public goods game has many
key features that can be dissected. This paper shows that risk
profiles and contribution rates in the public goods game can be
linked and are experienced differently depending on whether the
subject sees a gain frame, covered-loss frame or real-loss frame.
The main contribution of this paper shows the public goods game
in two types of loss domains and shows that a covered loss and
real loss treatment are statistically equivalent. This is a significant
finding for researchers who may not have the opportunity to
introduce real loss frames in their experimental design. This paper
also shows that the public goods game framed in the gains domain
leads participants to contribute significantly more than in a loss
domain, suggesting that house money effects rather than loss
aversion is the primary reason for the difference even when risk
preferences are accounted for.
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